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PRIVATE LAW
TRUSTS
Robert A. Pascal*
EFFECT OF 1964 TRUST CODE ON PRE-EXISTING TRUSTS
R.S. 9:2252, a provision of the 1964 Trust Code, purports to
validate dispositions in trust attempted before its effective date,
but invalid under the legislation then in effect, if they would
have been considered valid under the new Code. In Succession
of Simms' it was decided that this legislation could not be given
retroactive effect to the prejudice of rights acquired before the
effective date of the 1964 Code. In this particular case the
court, having concluded that the disposition attempted in a 1957
testamentary trust amounted to a substitution in trust prohibited
by article 4, section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution (as it
stood until amendment in 1962), decided that the heirs of the
settlor became entitled to the assets involved immediately on
her death and that to consider the disposition validated by the
1964 Trust Code would be to give that legislation the effect of
"divesting" the heirs of "acquired rights" in violation of article
IV, section 15, of the Louisiana Constitution. Conceding ar-
guendo only that a substitution prohibited in 1957 was involved
in this case, the writer submits that the conclusion of the court
was correct, but that the reason given therefor may be ques-
tioned.
Heirs unquestionably have their rights as heirs fixed at the
moment of the death of the deceased. A law which purported
to have retroactive effect to change one's position or interest
as heir would indeed "divest" an "acquired right." Thus, for
example, a law purporting to change the order of succession so
that ancestors would be preferred to descendants or illegitimates
made to share equally with legitimates, would, if retroactive,
operate to "divest acquired rights." But it is submitted that
R.S. 9:2252 would have operated retroactively in this case not
on the right of heirship as fixed under the law in effect in 1957,
but on a right- that to recover assets which were the object
of a donation then null for the reason that it violated a rule
of declared public order - in the patrimony to which the heirs
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 175 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), reversed on certiorari on issues
not discussed here; rehearing pending.
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succeeded and as to which they stand in no better position than
the deceased.2 Thus, if the statute could have operated to vali-
date the act of the donor himself and terminate his right to have
its nullity declared, then it can do so to the prejudice of his
heir.
Perhaps the following illustrations can serve to clarify the
point just made. Had the donor attempted a substitution in an
act inter vivos in 1957, he would have had the right to indicate
his decision to avail himself of the assets involved by filing a
suit to have the disposition declared null, by disposing of the
assets anew, or perhaps in other ways; but had he not exercised
his right to have the nullity declared, his 1957 act could have
been validated by the legislation of 1964. One can hardly be
heard to complain that the legislature has chosen to recognize
the lawfulness of his previously declared and presumably yet
subsisting will. Similarly, if, as in Simms, the donor had at-
tempted a substitution by testamentary act in 1957, his heirs,
as his successors, could have sought to have its nullity declared
or otherwise have asserted their claim to the assets involved; but
unless, and again as in Simms, the heirs had done so before 1964,
the legislation of that year would have validated the once null
disposition. The Simms decision, therefore, was correct in re-
sult because the heirs had sued before 1964 to have the nullity
declared; had they not sued or otherwise asserted their right to
the assets involved before 1964 the disposition would have been
validated by R.S. 9:2252 without the divestiture of an "ac-
quired right" in violation of article IV, section 15, of the Lou-
isiana Constitution.
If the above analysis is correct, then all trusts and disposi-
tions in trusts attempted before the effective date of the 1964
legislation, but of a kind permissible under the 1964 Trust Code,
are now valid against heirs unless they alleged their nullity or
otherwise asserted their claims to the assets involved before the
effective date of this legislation.'
2. IA. CIVIL CODE arts. 943, 945.
3. For this reason trusts attempted before 1.964 and incorporating the terms
of other trusts by reference, dispositions adding assets to existing trusts, and
attempts to provide for discretionary trusts, should now all be considered valid
if not challenged before the effective date of the 1964 legislation. Such provi-
sions were contained in the Simnms trusts, but were not discussed by the court
because of the position taken by them on the "divesting of acquired rights"
contention.
Author's note: The writer wishes to state that two of his colleagues have
offered different opinions on the basic issue. Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos
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"SUBSTITUTIONS" IN TRUSTS ATTEMPTED BEFORE
1964 TRUST CODE
The question in Succession of Simms 4 discussed immediately
above would not have arien, however, had not the court errone-
ously judged the disposition to amount to a substitution pro-
hibited in trusts under the law as it stood before 1964.5 What
the court judged to be a prohibited substitution was a disposi-
tion under which the settlor made a residuary legacy of assets
"in trust to [named trustees] .... Said properties ... shall
be held by them for . . . the natural life of my said grand-
daughter... and after her death... said properties shall pass
to my great-grandchildren [persons living and identified at
the creation of the trust]."6
The court construed this disposition as one containing two suc-
cessive transfers of ownership, the first to the trustees (for the
life of the granddaughter) and the second to the great-grand-
children. Now it is true that the essence of the substitution
prohibited by article 1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code and article
IV, section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution is the disposition
of ownership to two or more persons in succession, either di-
rectly as a double effect of the act of the donor or indirectly
through a charge imposed on the first donee;7 but what is not
tolerable technically is the construction of a disposition "in
trust" to a trustee as one of ownership within the context of the
law of substitutions.' If this construction were correct, then
every trust would contain a prohibited substitution, for at the
suggests that under the strict theory of null acts not even the settlor could
have been deprived of the right to the assets involved by attempted validat-
ing legislation. Professor Saul Litvinoff is of the opinion that subsequent
legislation could have validated an inter vivos act to the prejudice of the
settlor who had not yet asserted his right to the assets involved; but he also
believes that the heirs should not be considered to stand in the position of
their ancestor in title and that validating legislation subsequent to the time
of their inheritance would operate to divest acquired rights.
4. 175 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
5. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended in 1962, permits substitutions in trusts
to the extent allowed by legislation. Hence any disposition allowed by the 1964
Trust Code is to be considered valid even though it contains a substitution
constitutionally forbidden until 1962. Moreover, if the 1962 constitutional amend-
ment can be considered to ratify prospectively the provisions of the 1938 Trust
Estates Act allowing substitutions in trust, then dispositions attempted under
that law after the effective date of the constitutional amendment of 1962 should
also be considered valid even if they would have been deemed invalid before 1962.
6. 175 So. 2d 113, 116-1.7 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
7. See Pascal, The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273 (1959).
8. See Pascal, Of Trusts, Ruman Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes, 23 LA.
L,. REv. 639, particularly at 639-40 and 656-60 (1963).
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end of every trust the trustee must transfer the assets to an-
other person (the principal beneficiary). This point was very
well made by an astute counsel in Succession of Singlust,9 and
the court there disposed of the contention with the very sensible
observation that it could not consider all trusts invalid on that
ground if the very provision of the Louisiana Constitution which
forbade substitutions also specifically sanctioned trusts.'0 Thus
on this basis alone the decision in Simms must be considered
unacceptable.
The root of the difficulty in such cases is, of course, the
Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Succession of Guillory,"
and that of the court of appeal in In re Succession of Meadors.12
Until our bench, bar, law reform agencies, and legislature come
to understand that the trustee's "title" is not "ownership" within
the meaning of our basic civil law legislation, but only a term
of Anglo-American legal art to indicate the trustee's authority
to deal with the trust assets, our decisions and our trust legisla-
tion will continue to run contrary to our basic enacted civil law
and defeat the justifiable expectations of the public.' 3 There is
indication, too, that the erroneous understanding of the signifi-
cance of the trustee's title may be carried over into other areas
of the law to work havoc. Thus, dictum in Dunham v. Dunham 4
asserts that assets in trust for a husband as sole beneficiary are
neither his nor his to administer and therefore that the income
therefrom during marriage does not form part of the community
of acquets and gains. Had the court understood that the hus-
band actually owned the assets in trust and that these assets
9. 169 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
10. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as it was before amendment in 1962.
1. 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957).
12. 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
13. The basis of difficulty could have been eliminated had the Louisiana
State Law Institute, in drafting the 1964 Trust Code, followed the writer's
suggestion to define the trust in functional terms consistent with Louisiana's
legal system. The trustee then would have been envisioned as an agent or admin-
istrator with special powers rather than one with "title" - the term so confus-
ing to Louisianians - and "ownership" would have been envisioned as belonging
to the beneficiaries. The matter was presented to the Institute's Reporter for
the Trust Code and his advisors constantly from 1959 to 1963, to the Institute'"
Council in two separate memoranda in 1960 and 1963, from the floor at the
annual meeting of the Institute in 1960, and finally in the article, Of Trusts,
Human Dignity, Legal &ience, and Taxes, 23 LA. L. REv. 639 (1963). It was
also one of the topics discussed before Louisiana Senate Judiciary Committee C
in July 1964 when the writer appeared briefly at the request of its chairman to
voice the reasons for his objection to the Institute's draft of the Trust Code. All
these utterances, however, fell on deaf ears.
14. 174 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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were being administered for his benefit by the trustee, this state-
ment could not have been made.
TRUSTS To BEGIN IN THE FUTURE
May a trust be created to begin as of a future date, either
after a term or on a suspensive condition? This is a question
which would have been presented in Succession of Simms 5 had
not the court ruled invalid the entire attempt to create a trust,
all as discussed above. After providing for a trust in favor of
her granddaughter as income beneficiary and her named great-
grandchildren as principal beneficiaries, the settlor directed that
should any of those principal beneficiaries be a minor at the
termination of the trust his interest should be subject to a sec-
ond trust in his favor. Clearly a settlor can provide for the
continuation of a trust as to each principal beneficiary until his
majority or for any portion of his life, and here even under
terms which would come into effect only after the termination
of the trust as to other beneficiaries. Should there be a distinc-
tion, then, between continuing a trust as such and having a sec-
ond trust take effect on the termination of the first trust? Any
distinction would have to be based on literal applications of
the legislation without regard for the purposes and objectives
of the rules. Thus under the 1964 Trust Code the interest of
the principal beneficiary must be acquired immediately on crea-
tion of the trust, whether inter vivos or testamentary,1 6 and if
the beneficiary is envisioned as "acquiring" anew under the
second trust, at a date later than the effective date of the act
setting up the trust, then that rule is violated and the second
trust is invalid. On the other hand, if it is understood, as it
should be, that the interest of the principal beneficiary was
transferred to him as of the date of the inter vivos act or testa-
ment providing for the trusts, and that his interests will simply
be subject to one or more successive trust administrations, then
no difficulty will be found. Here again a definition of the trust
in functional civilian terms would have helped avoid confusion
of thought and paved the way for a better appreciation of what
might be done lawfully through the trust device. This subject
deserves more extensive consideration, but this observation will
serve at least to indicate that we should be most careful to
understand our legislation radically and not superficially.
15. 175 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
16. LA. R.S. 9:1971 (1964).
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PRIVATE TRUST FOR A PURPOSE
Another most important trust issue was raised in Lelong v.
Succession of Lelong,'7 but its determination was avoided be-
cause of the interpretation of the facts of the case adopted by
the court. In a testamentary trust the settlor had declared:
"I want the balance of my estate put in trust like it is for
ten years - not wishing my real estate to be divided or sold
and neither the securities inherited or bought and hardly
accumulated dispersed for lesser values. . . . I want [my
trustees] to consider first, the development of my proper-
ties, their exploitation, in a rational way, and for these ex-
penses and reserves for the future, 2/3 (two-thirds) of the
income ... should be kept every year which means . . . the
balance 1/3 could be distributed to my heirs, if conditions
allow it....
"This trust should last ten years after the day of my
death."s8
Showing that the condition of the settlor's succession and its
tax liability would make it impossible to preserve intact the
residue of his assets placed in trust, and arguing that it was
the settlor's principal purpose in creating the trust to maintain
those assets intact, the heirs contended that the trust should be
terminated as being "impossible of fulfillment," citing La. R.S.
9:2174 of the Trust Estates Law of 1938.19 The court, however,
construed the settlor's will to create the trust absolutely and
to do no more than suggest that his assets be kept intact. To
reach this result the court cited Corpus Juris Secundum to af-
firm that "that construction of a trust instrument will be fa-
vored which upholds the validity of the trust and renders the
trust effective."20 The writer, while admitting that the rule
just quoted is applicable when there is doubt as to the settlor's
purpose in creating the trust,21 would not have entertained a
17. 164 So.2d 671 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
18. Id. at 673.
19. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 90, once LA. U.S. 9:2174, now repealed by La.
Acts 1964, No. 338, §§ 1, 3. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 13, once LA. R.S. 9:1843,
now repealed by La. Acts 1964, No. 338, §§ 1, 3, might also have been cited.
20.-A better source would have been article 1.713 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
one of the rules for the interpretation of legacies, which is to the same effect.
21. Thus under the Louisiana Civil Code the first rule on the interpretation
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doubt in this case. The writer is of the opinion that the settlor's
language indicated his purpose to be the preservation of his as-
sets intact. Evidently he had little if any concern for his "bene-
ficiaries," for even though they "could" be paid as much as one-
third of the trust income, they were to be so paid, and appar-
ently at the discretion of the trustees, only "if conditions allow";
that is to say, presumably, if such payment could be made with-
out prejudice to his announced purpose of developing and ex-
ploiting his beloved assets.
By concluding that the trust had not been established simply
or primarily to keep the settlor's assets intact the court avoided
having to decide whether such a purpose would be lawful. The
dictum of the court, however, indicates that it would not have
declared the trust invalid on that ground.2 2 Again the writer
would disagree. According to both the Trust Estates Law of
1938, under which the trust was created, and the Trust Code of
1964, a private express trust is one established for a person.28
There is no legislative basis for a trust established for a purpose
rather than for persons, unless it is a trust for "charitable,"
that is to say, social, purposes. Thus, in the writer's opinion,
the entire trust should have been declared unlawful. Tending
toward a contrary solution is the implication of the provisions
of the former and present trust laws permitting a trust to con-
tinue beyond the lives of the named beneficiaries, 24 but these
provisions do not amount to an affirmation that a trust may
be created for a private purpose rather than for beneficiaries.
Moreover, the validity of such provisions may well be ques-
tioned, for they are contrary to the whole purpose of private
law, the good of living individuals and, therefore, to use the
positivist term in our trust legislation, contrary to "public
policy."
of legacies is that the intention of the testator must be ascertained (art. 1712)
only secondly, in the writer's opinion (under article 1713 mentioned in note 20
supra), is consideration to be given to the interpretation which can have effect
rather than to that which can have none.
22. 164 So. 2d 671, 675 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
23. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 2 (16), once LA. R.S. 9:1792 (16), now repealed
by La. Acts 1964, No. 338, §§ 1, 3; l.A. R.S. 9:1731, enacted by La. Acts 1964, No.
338, § 2.
24. La. Acts 1938, No. 81, § 4, once LA. R.S. 9:1794, now repealed by La.
Acts 1964, No. 338, §§ 1, 3; LA. R.S. 9:1831 and 9;1,33 as enacted by La,
Acts 1964, No. 338, § 2.
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